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i 
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES 
Pursuant to D.C. Cir. Rule 28(a)(1)(A), the undersigned certifies as follows:  
(A) Parties and Amici. To amici’s knowledge, all parties, intervenors, and 
amici appearing in this Court are listed in the Brief for Appellant in this 
case, No. 18-5007.  
 
(B) Ruling Under Review. To amici’s knowledge, references to the ruling at 
issue appear in the Brief for Appellant in this case, No. 18-5007.  
 
(C) Related Cases. To amici’s knowledge, references to any related cases 
appear in the Brief for Appellant in this case, No. 18-5007. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING CONSENT TO FILE AND AUTHORSHIP 
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  
 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel 
for a party, nor any person other than the amici curiae, its members, or its counsel, 
contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation or submission of this 
brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E). 
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1 
   I. Interests of Amici Curiae and Summary of the Argument  
 
 Amici Curiae listed in Appendix A are scholars on financial regulation and 
consumer finance who regularly study the legal underpinnings of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the Bureau).   
The orderly succession of government leadership, including of regulatory 
agencies, is a fundamental pillar of the rule of law in this country. This case 
involves one such controversy, over the rightful Acting Director of the CFPB 
following the resignation of the Bureau’s first Senate-confirmed Director. The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act or 
Dodd-Frank) is clear: the Deputy Director of the CFPB “shall . . . serve as acting 
Director in the absence or unavailability of the Director.” 12 U.S.C. § 
5491(b)(5)(B). Thus, upon the Director’s resignation, the CFPB’s Deputy Director, 
Leandra English, became Acting Director and may serve in that role until a new 
Director has been confirmed by the Senate or recess appointed.  
Despite this clear congressional directive, Appellee Donald J. Trump refused 
to abide by Section 5491(b)(5)(B). Instead, he illegally seized control of the CFPB 
by naming the current Director of Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
Appellee John Michael Mulvaney, as Acting CFPB Director. Appellees assert that 
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a), authorizes 
this appointment.  
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2 
As scholars of financial regulation, we contend that Deputy Director 
English’s claim is correct because the Dodd-Frank Act is the only statute that 
governs this succession dispute. In Dodd-Frank, Congress expressly decreed a 
mandatory line of succession for an Acting CFPB Director, stating that the Deputy 
Director “shall” serve as the Acting Director in the event of the Director’s vacancy. 
Congress enacted this provision after considering and rejecting the FVRA during 
the drafting of the Dodd-Frank Act. Further, Congress’s choice of this succession 
provision is intrinsic to the CFPB’s design as an agency with unique independence 
from policy control by the White House. The appointment of any White House 
official, but particularly the OMB Director, as Acting CFPB Director is repugnant 
to the statutory CFPB independence that Congress ordained.  
Nor does the FVRA apply to this case because it yields to subsequently 
enacted statutes with express mandatory provisions for filling vacancies at federal 
agencies. This is apparent from the text of the FVRA, from the FVRA’s legislative 
history, and from the basic constitutional principle that an earlier Congress cannot 
bind a subsequent Congress.  
For these reasons, Deputy Director English’s request for a preliminary 
injunction should be granted.   
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3 
II. Argument 
A. The Text, Structure, Purpose, and Legislative History of the 
Dodd-Frank Act Show That It Provides the Exclusive Mechanism 
for the Succession of the Acting CFPB Director 
1. “Shall” Means “Shall”: Congress Unambiguously 
Mandated an Exclusive Succession Line for CFPB 
Director in the Dodd-Frank Act 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress explicitly mandated the order of 
succession for the Acting CFPB Director. In the event of the “absence or 
unavailability of the Director”—words sweeping enough to include resignation, 
which Appellees do not “squarely dispute[]” (JA267)—the Deputy Director “shall” 
serve as Acting Director. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B) (emphasis added). By 
choosing the word “shall,” Congress made its meaning unmistakable: the Dodd-
Frank Act provides a mandatory and therefore exclusive line of succession for the 
Acting CFPB Director. This language in Dodd-Frank precludes any other method 
for appointing an Acting Director for the CFPB. Invoking the FVRA as authority 
for Appellee Mulvaney’s appointment would override Congress’s express 
directive.  
2. Congress Rejected the Application of the FVRA to 
CFPB Director Succession, as the Legislative History 
Shows 
The legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act shows that Congress 
consciously rejected the FVRA as an authority on CFPB Director succession. The 
House version of Dodd-Frank contemplated a “Consumer Financial Protection 
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Agency” to be initially led by a single Director and who would later be replaced by 
a multi-member commission. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4102(b)(6)(B) (2010). The 
House Bill stated that the FVRA would govern while there was a sole Director. Id. 
In contrast to the House version, the Senate Bill, S. 3217, adopted the single 
Director structure, which Congress ultimately adopted. Nowhere in the sections of 
Dodd-Frank governing the CFPB did Congress mention the FVRA.  
Contrary to the District Court’s reasoning, JA 281-82, this legislative history 
shows that Congress knew how to invoke the FVRA when it wanted to and that it 
opted not to do so. In the final legislation, Congress deliberately rejected the 
FVRA as a succession method and made clear that the FVRA would not apply by 
using the mandatory word “shall” in the line of succession.  
3. The Dodd-Frank Act’s CFPB Director Succession 
Provision is Key to the Agency Independence That 
Congress Ordained 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s line of succession when the Director is unavailable or 
absent is intrinsic to Congress’s overall design of the CFPB, which established a 
structure to preserve the agency’s independence from the President while ensuring 
accountability to Congress and the public.1  
                                                
1 In the leading challenge to the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure, 
this Court recently held that “the for-cause protection shielding the CFPB’s sole 
Director is fully compatible with the President’s constitutional authority.”   PHH 
Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 34 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 31, 2018) (en banc). 
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5 
a. Congress Designed the Bureau to Insulate It 
from Political Pressure  
Independence from the White House has been a pillar of federal bank 
regulation since 1863, when the National Bank Act was enacted. Congress clothes 
all federal bank regulators with independence to ensure the solvency of the 
banking system and the financial health of Americans. See PHH Corp. v. 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 30 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 
31, 2018) (en banc) (“Financial regulation, in particular, has long been thought to 
be well served by a degree of independence”); id. at 31-34. Without that 
independence, the President could try to gain control of the credit channel or even 
direct lending to political cronies to juice the economy for near-term political gain. 
Freeing federal bank regulators from daily White House control is essential to the 
nation’s financial stability and to ensure that banks are not used for political 
means.  
When Congress created the CFPB in the Dodd-Frank Act, it was particularly 
concerned with ensuring the agency’s independence. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 
11, 174 (2010); Statement of Senator Cardin, Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act—Conference Report, Cong. Rec. S5870, S5871 (July 15, 2010); 
Statement of Senator Kaufman, id. at S5885.  
Congress established the CFPB in response to the 2008 financial crisis and 
the consumer abuses that preceded it. Later investigations found that deregulation 
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by federal prudential bank regulators, who were charged with consumer financial 
protection at the time, contributed to the 2008 crisis. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL 
& PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY 
FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 149-205 (2011); FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xvii-xviii, xxi, xxiii (2011). 
Regulators had put short-term profitability of banks over consumer welfare 
because their dual missions--bank solvency and consumer protection--conflicted. 
Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 
ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. SERV. L. 321, 329-31 (2013). 
“Regulatory capture”—in which agencies serve their regulated entities to the 
detriment of the public—also plagued federal bank regulation before 2010. See, 
e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of 
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2041-45 (2014). To 
address these concerns, Congress transferred primary federal jurisdiction over 
consumer financial protection from the federal prudential bank regulators to the 
CFPB, which has one sole mission: protecting the financial health of American 
families.  
Congress sought to insulate the new CFPB from industry capture and 
political interference by endowing it with structural safeguards of independence 
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7 
from the executive branch and the White House. These safeguards include 
statutory status as an independent agency, a Director appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate who cannot be fired without cause, a situs outside of 
the executive branch, independent funding, and exemption from OMB and White 
House oversight.2 Dodd-Frank’s provision on the appointment of the Acting CFPB 
Director is pivotal to this agency independence. 
i. Independent Agency Status 
The Dodd-Frank Act expressly stipulates the CFPB’s independence: “There 
is established in the Federal Reserve System, an independent bureau to be known 
as the ‘Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’ . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) 
(emphasis added).  
ii. Term and Tenure of the CFPB Director 
The CFPB’s single Director structure is intrinsic to the agency independence 
that Congress mandated from ongoing policy control by the White House. The 
CFPB is led by a Director, who “shall be appointed by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate,” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2), and “shall serve for 
a term of 5 years.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(1). This five-year term allows the Director 
                                                
2 The CFPB Director does not exercise “unchecked” authority, contrary to 
the District Court’s assertion.  JA 277.  As this Court recently observed, “the 
CFPB’s power and influence are not out of the ordinary for a financial regulator or, 
indeed, any type of independent administrative agency.”  PHH Corp., supra, slip 
op. at 51; see also id. at 60.  
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to serve beyond the four-year term of the President and safeguards the CFPB’s 
autonomy.  
The Dodd-Frank Act further bolstered the independence of the CFPB by 
stating that that the President may only “remove the Director for inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3). This 
provision—which this Court upheld as constitutional in PHH Corp. (supra, slip op. 
at 67-68)--protects the Director from termination due to a policy difference with 
the President. Without for-cause-only removal, a President could credibly threaten 
to fire the CFPB Director unless the Director acceded to the President’s demands. 
If the Director refused, the President could replace him with a new (and 
presumably docile) Director. That, in turn, would allow exactly what bank 
regulation seeks to prevent: an attempt by the President to fire up the economy by 
relaxing consumer finance rules and thereby credit, leaving the aftermath of high-
risk loans to a future White House. Cf. PHH Corp., supra, slip op. at 34 (Congress 
has consistently conferred independence on financial regulators to permit short-run 
decisions that are unpopular but beneficial for the economy in the long run). 
Likewise, power to fire at will could allow the President to meddle in enforcement 
decisions. 
Without for-cause-only protection from termination, the powerful financial 
services lobby could lean on the President to relax regulations through removal or 
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the threat of removal of the Director. Consumer advocates cannot compete with 
such well-oiled lobbying. The for-cause-only termination clause helps ensures that 
firms cannot stop or reverse regulation simply by persuading the President to 
threaten the CFPB Director with removal.  
iii. Organizational Situs 
Congress placed the CFPB within the Federal Reserve System as “an 
independent bureau.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). Because the Federal Reserve System 
itself is outside of the executive branch, this decision helps cordon off the CFPB 
from political pressure.  
The decision to locate the CFPB outside of the executive branch is the norm 
for financial regulators. The Federal Reserve System is independently located, as 
are the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), National Credit Union 
Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission. While the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency sits within the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, it is free from interference by the Treasury 
Secretary (12 U.S.C. § 1; 31 U.S.C. § 321(c)) and considered independent. See 
PHH Corp., supra, slip op. at 32. 
On top of independence from the President, Congress also walled off the 
CFPB from interference by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Under 
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Dodd-Frank, absent other statutory authority, the Federal Reserve Board may not: 
(1) “intervene in any matter or proceeding before the Director, including 
examinations or enforcement actions;” (2) “appoint, direct, or remove any officer 
or employee of the Bureau;” or (3) “merge or consolidate the Bureau, or any of the 
functions or responsibilities of the Bureau, with any division or office of the Board 
of Governors or the Federal reserve banks.” 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(2). Similarly, the 
Federal Reserve Board “may not delay or prevent the issuance of any rule or order 
of the Bureau” and “[n]o rule or order of the Bureau shall be subject to approval or 
review by the Board of Governors.” 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(3).  
In sum, Congress took pains to assure the CFPB’s independence by locating 
it outside of the executive branch and insulating it from Federal Reserve Board 
interference. 
iv. Independent Funding 
There are different ways for industry to capture agencies, but threats to 
funding are among the most effective. For this reason, Congress has historically 
funded federal bank regulators outside of the appropriations process. See PHH 
Corp., supra, slip op. at 40 (“financial regulators ordinarily are independent of the 
congressional appropriations process”); id. at 13, 41. 
While the CFPB, like all other federal bank regulators, is exempt from the 
appropriations process, unlike other federal bank regulators it does not generate its 
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own funding. Instead, the CFPB’s funding consists of transfers from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve, capped at twelve percent of the total operating 
expenses of the Federal Reserve System reported in the Federal Reserve Board’s 
2009 annual report, adjusted for inflation. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1)-(a)(2).  
Congress gave the CFPB independent funding due to the risks of relying on 
the appropriations process. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 163 (2010) (“[T]he assurance 
of adequate funding [for the CFPB from the Federal Reserve Board], independent 
of the Congressional appropriations process, is absolutely essential to the 
independent operations of any financial regulator”).  
The CFPB is the only federal bank regulator with a cap on its budget and its 
budget is, as a result, modest compared to the budgets of other federal financial 
regulators. See id. at 163-164. Thus, while the CFPB is structured to be 
independent of the political horse-trading of the appropriations process, it is kept 
on a tighter budgetary leash than any other federal bank regulator.  
v. Limitations on Executive Oversight 
As it did with other independent federal bank regulators, Congress further 
exempted CFPB actions from executive branch approval. In one such measure, 
Congress provided that legislative recommendations, testimony, and comments by 
the CFPB shall not undergo executive branch review, whether by OMB or any 
other federal officer or agency:  
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No officer or agency of the United States shall have any authority 
to require the Director or any other officer of the Bureau to submit 
legislative recommendations, or testimony or comments on 
legislation, to any officer or agency of the United States for 
approval, comments, or review prior to the submission of such 
recommendations, testimony, or comments to the Congress [as long 
as those CFPB documents indicate that the views expressed therein 
are the CFPB’s own].  
12 U.S.C. § 5493(c)(4).  
In another important example, Congress exempted the CFPB from budgetary 
review by OMB. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFPB to provide copies of the 
Bureau’s Director’s financial operating plans, forecasts, and quarterly reports to 
the Director of OMB. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(4)(A). In a companion measure, 
however, Congress provided that there is no “obligation on the part of the [CFPB] 
Director to consult with or obtain the consent or approval of the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget with respect to any report, plan, forecast, or” 
other information provided to OMB. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(4)(E). Similarly, nothing 
in the CFPB’s reporting requirements to OMB may “be construed as implying . . . 
any jurisdiction or oversight over the affairs or operations of the Bureau.” Id.  
Finally, the CFPB, like all federal bank regulators, is excused from 
submitting its rules to OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) for review and cost-benefit analysis. Executive Order 12866, Regulatory 
Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993). This results from an 
exemption in Executive Order 12866 for agencies deemed to be “independent 
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regulatory agencies” under the Paperwork Reduction Act, including the CFPB. Id. 
§ 3(b); 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (listing the CFPB as an independent regulatory 
agency). Thus, the CFPB and other federal bank regulators are exempt from White 
House review of their rules. Instead, Congress retains the ultimate oversight over 
CFPB policy. 
b.  The Dodd-Frank Act’s Directorship Succession 
Provision Is Critical to the CFPB’s Independence 
Dodd-Frank’s provision on the appointment procedure for the Acting CFPB 
Director underpins the independence that is a hallmark of the CFPB. Under Dodd-
Frank, the White House’s most important role with respect to the CFPB—the 
appointment of the permanent CFPB Director—may only be made “by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2). In contrast, no 
federal statute mandates Senate confirmation for appointment of an Acting 
Director of the CFPB.  
Application of the FVRA would encourage the President to drag out 
nomination of a permanent CFPB Director until the end of his term. Such strategic 
delay would allow this and future Presidents to deny their successors the right to 
appoint a permanent CFPB Director during their first term. Under Appellees’ 
reading, a President could appoint a rotating cast of Acting Directors, each for 210-
day terms, and then nominate a permanent Director at the end of the Presidency. If 
confirmed, that permanent Director would be able to outlast the first term of the 
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next Presidency by serving a full 5-year term. In other words, a President could 
manipulate the process by having as many as 8 years of Acting Directors of his 
choice and then appointing a permanent CFPB Director for a five-year term. This 
outcome would circumvent Dodd-Frank’s requirement that the Senate confirm a 
permanent CFPB Director for a 5-year term. The Appellees’ position gives the 
President an incentive to delay putting a nominee through the Senate confirmation 
process, while the Appellant’s interpretation incentivizes the President to swiftly 
announce a nomination if he wishes to shape the Bureau.  
B.  The FVRA Does Not Afford an Alternative Way of Appointing an 
Acting CFPB Director 
According to Appellees, the FVRA provides an alternative method for filling 
top vacancies temporarily at federal agencies, even when Congress later specified a 
different method. Appellees are mistaken because they ignore both the text and 
legislative history of the FVRA and a fundamental constitutional principle. 
Together, these sources compel the conclusion that the Dodd-Frank Act is the sole 
mechanism for appointing an Acting CFPB Director. 
1. When a Later Statute Expressly Mandates an Acting 
Officer, as the Dodd-Frank Act Does, the FVRA Does Not 
Apply 
In Section 3347, the FVRA states that it is the “exclusive means for 
temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties of 
any office of an Executive agency … for which appointment is required to be made 
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by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, unless—(1) a 
statutory provision expressly—…(B) designates an officer or employee to perform 
the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity…” 5 
U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1). The Dodd-Frank Act’s CPFB successorship provision is 
exactly such “a statutory provision expressly…designat[ing] an officer or 
employee to perform the functions and duties of [the CFPB Director] temporarily 
in an acting capacity.”  Consequently, the FVRA, by its express terms, does not 
apply to the CFPB Directorship.  
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act’s express wording precludes using the 
FVRA as an alternative basis for appointing an Acting CFPB Director. Dodd-
Frank states that the CFPB Deputy Director “shall” serve as Acting Director in 
case of the “absence or unavailability” of the agency’s Director. By using the word 
“shall,” Congress issued as express and unmistakable a command as imaginable 
without adding “magic words” rejecting the FVRA process. The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly made clear that “magic words” are not required for a provision to be 
express. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (“Exemptions from the 
terms of the . . . Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement . . . that 
modifications must be express[.] But . . . [u]nless we are to require the Congress to 
employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the . . . Act, 
we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the . . . provisions of 
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that Act”); Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 149 (2005) (Scalia, J. 
concurring) (“When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an 
earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any 
earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or other ‘magical password.’”) 
(emphasis in original).  
The District Court sought to distinguish Marcello and Lockhart as involving 
“future-limiting rules” in prior legislation. The Court reasoned that the only issue 
here “is whether the CFPB’s Deputy Director provision displaces a prior statute, 
the FVRA.” JA 265.  However, Appellees and the District Court effectively read a 
future-limiting rule into Section 3347 by interpreting that Section to create a 
perpetual alternative method for temporary appointments under the FVRA. If their 
construction were correct, Congress could never enact a separate succession 
provision that precluded application of the FVRA. That is the essence of a future-
limiting rule.  
The District Court also reasoned that “shall” in Dodd-Frank does not mean 
“shall.” The District Court pointed to language in the FVRA stating that the first 
assistant “shall perform” the duties of the vacant office. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1); see 
JA 268. The Court then observed that the FVRA modified the word “shall” by 
proceeding to say that “notwithstanding” that requirement, the President “may” 
appoint another eligible official to perform those duties, thus making “shall” a non-
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absolute imperative. Id. § 3345(a)(1)-(a)(2); see JA 268-69.  
The Court’s reasoning fails. Unlike the FVRA, the Dodd-Frank CFPB 
succession clause provides only one way for someone to become acting Bureau 
head. There is no equivalent “notwithstanding” language in the Dodd-Frank Act 
provision. Because that Dodd-Frank succession provision uses the word “shall” 
with no escape clause, it is couched as a “must” and brooks no exception. As such, 
it is an express clause overriding the FVRA succession procedure and supplants 
the FVRA in determining the rightful Acting Director of the CFPB.3  
Dodd-Frank’s language that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided expressly by 
law, all Federal laws dealing with . . . officers [or] employees . . . apply to the 
exercise of the powers of the” CFPB does not alter this result. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). 
The CFPB succession provision in Dodd-Frank is clear: the Deputy Director “shall 
. . . serve as acting Director in the absence or unavailability of the Director.”  Id. § 
5491(b)(5). By using the word “shall,” Congress “provided expressly by law” that 
Section 5491(b)(5) controls appointment of the Acting CFPB Director and 
                                                
3  Furthermore, if the FVRA provided an alternative mechanism, the Dodd-
Frank CFPB succession provision would be superfluous on these facts because the 
Deputy Director could become Acting Director under the “first assistant” option of 
the FVRA in 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) if the President did not appoint someone else.  
Contrary to the District Court’s reasoning, JA 274-75, it is irrelevant that the 
Dodd-Frank provision might still be available in other circumstances such as the 
Director’s temporary absence, since Appellees argue that it is not available here.  
Similarly, the lack of a time limit on the Deputy Director’s service as acting head 
under Dodd-Frank is not a problem because the provision gives the President 
strong incentives to promptly nominate a permanent Director. 
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overrides the FVRA. Any other interpretation would render the verb “shall” 
meaningless and defy Congress’s command. 
2. The FVRA Does Not Apply to Later Statutes that Expressly 
Mandate a Line of Succession 
In contending that the FVRA always provides an alternative method for 
temporarily filling vacancies at federal agencies, Appellees rely on a selective 
reading of the FVRA’s legislative history that clashes with a bedrock constitutional 
principle—that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress. According to 
Appellees, Section 3347 of the FVRA provides that the FVRA is either the 
exclusive or alternative succession provision for filling a vacancy; the FVRA is 
always available no matter what another statute provides. Yet, Section 3347 is 
open to another (correct) reading, namely that the word “exclusive” simply makes 
clear that the FVRA applies absent an express opt-out provision that causes 
another statute to control. Accordingly, Appellees’ argument depends on the 
legislative history of the FVRA (and on a single reported decision that also relied 
on the FVRA’s legislative history).  
a. The Legislative History States That the FVRA Cannot 
Be Used to Fill a Vacancy If a Later Statute Expressly 
Mandates Another Mechanism 
Appellees invoke the FVRA’s legislative history as evidence that the FVRA 
is either the exclusive or alternative way of temporarily filling vacancies at federal 
agencies. The FVRA’s legislative history, however, carefully distinguishes 
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between the application of the FVRA to existing statutes and to subsequently 
enacted statutes. As that legislative history shows, Congress never meant for the 
FVRA to serve as an alternative for subsequent succession statutes that expressly 
supersede the FVRA. This removes any apparent conflict between the FVRA and 
the Dodd-Frank CFPB succession provision because Congress, when it drafted the 
FVRA, specifically contemplated that express, mandatory successorship clauses in 
subsequently enacted statutes would supplant the FVRA’s mechanism. In the 
process, Congress honored a key canon of statutory construction: that recent 
enactments should be favored over older ones. 
The Senate Report on the FVRA explains that that there are three exceptions 
to its application. The first deals with subsequently enacted statutes, which 
“govern” if they “expressly provide” that they supersede the FVRA. The second 
deals with existing statutes, for which the Vacancies Act stands as an alternative 
appointment method for acting officers, and the third, not relevant here, deals with 
recess appointments: 
[Section 3347 of the FVRA] does allow temporary 
appointments to be made other than through the Vacancies Reform 
Act in three narrowly delineated exceptions. First, where Congress 
provides that a statutory provision expressly provides that it 
supersedes the Vacancies Reform Act, the other statute will govern. 
But statutes enacted in the future purporting to or argued to be 
construed to govern the temporary filling of offices covered by this 
statute are not to be effective unless they expressly provide that 
they are superseding the Vacancies Reform Act. Second, the bill 
retains existing statutes that are in effect on the date of enactment 
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of the Vacancies Act of 1998 that expressly authorize the President, 
or the head of an executive department to designate an officer to 
perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in 
an acting capacity, as well as statutes that expressly provide for the 
temporary performance of the functions and duties of an office by a 
particular officer or employee. (This includes statutes that provide 
for an automatic designation, unless the President designates 
another official). The Committee is aware of the existence of 
statutes specifically governing a vacancy in 41 specific offices, 40 
of which would be retained by this bill.... 
S. Rep. 105-250, 1998 WL 404532 at *15.  Because this legislative history is 
plainly “anchored” to the statutory text, Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 
583 (1994), it deserves great weight. 
The Dodd-Frank Act clearly falls within the first exception described in the 
legislative history: it is a statute enacted by Congress after the FVRA, and it has 
express language indicating that it supersedes the FVRA because it states that the 
Deputy Director “shall” serve as Acting Director in the event of the Director’s 
absence or unavailability.  Nor does the Dodd-Frank provision result in an 
“implied repeal” of the FVRA, JA 270-71, 273-74, because Section 3347 yields to 
future statutes that expressly supersede the FVRA, as the legislative history makes 
clear.  
The District Court overlooks this legislative history, JA 247-92, while 
Appellees twist its meaning through selective reading. Appellees ignore the first 
exception to the FVRA discussed in the legislative history. That is the exception 
applying to subsequently enacted statutes and covers the Dodd-Frank CFPB 
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successorship provision. Instead, Appellees focus on the second exception 
mentioned in the legislative history, even though that exception is inapposite, 
because it is limited to pre-existing statutes. Likewise, the only reported case on 
the FVRA is inapplicable because it deals with the General Counsel of the National 
Labor Relations Board, one of the 40 offices specifically mentioned in the 
legislative history as under an existing statute. Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support 
Services, 186 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2016). The District Court opinion did not 
acknowledge that the legislative history rendered Hooks distinguishable. JA 263-
64. Similarly, opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel on the FVRA are 
confined to existing, rather than subsequent statutes. See, e.g., Acting Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121 (2003); Authority of the 
President to Name an Acting Attorney General, 31 Op. O.L.C. 208 (2007). None of 
these precedents applies to the CFPB Directorship.4  
b. A Past Congress Cannot Bind a Future Congress 
The legislative history’s distinction between the FVRA’s applicability to 
existing and subsequently enacted statutes is also the only reading that comports 
with a fundamental constitutional principle: that a law passed by an earlier 
Congress cannot bind a future Congress. If Appellees’ reading prevailed, an earlier 
                                                
4 Notably, the OLC opinion on the CFPB did not address this aspect of the 
FVRA’s legislative history addressing subsequent statutes, only that concerning 
existing statutes, despite the Dodd-Frank Act being a subsequent statute. 
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Congress (the FVRA Congress in 1998) could bind a later Congress (the Dodd-
Frank Congress in 2010) by requiring the later Congress to preserve the FVRA as 
an alternative method of filling vacancies for any statutory position that the later 
Congress created, despite the later Congress’s express rejection of that alternative.  
This is wrong as a matter of constitutional law. While the FVRA Congress could 
amend previously existing statutes, it could not require the FVRA to always be an 
alternative method of appointment regardless what future Congresses decided to 
the contrary.  
The democratic foundation of American government cannot tolerate an 
earlier Congress binding a subsequent one through legislation. Otherwise, a past 
Congress could exercise dead hand control even if voters later ousted it at the polls. 
Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908); United States v. Shull, 
793 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1061 (S.D. Ohio 2011). Precisely for this reason, the 
legislative history of the FVRA acknowledged that future statutes had to be treated 
differently than existing statutes. Accordingly, Appellees’ position that the FVRA 
stands as a constant alternative line of succession is incorrect. The FVRA might be 
an alternative method for filling vacancies at agencies created under existing 
statutes, but it cannot be for agencies created after its enactment when a 
subsequently enacted statutory line of succession expressly supersedes the 
application of the FVRA.  
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C.  Appointment of the Sitting OMB Director as Acting CFPB Director 
Violates the CFPB Independence Mandated by Congress 
Even if the Court held that the FVRA controls the CFPB Directorship 
succession, the President violated Dodd-Frank by designating Appellee Mulvaney, 
the sitting OMB Director, as Acting CFPB Director. His appointment flouted 
Congress’s will by putting the CFPB under daily White House control. That is 
exactly what Congress sought to prevent by creating an exclusive mechanism in 
the Dodd-Frank Act for appointing an Acting CFPB Director.5  
OMB “is an office in the Executive Office of the President.” 31 U.S.C. § 
501. Because Appellee Mulvaney is OMB Director, that makes him a White House 
official. Appellee Mulvaney told the press that he is continuing to head OMB 
while working as the Acting CFPB Director. See Renae Merle, Dueling officials 
spend chaotic day vying to lead federal consumer watchdog, WASH. POST (Nov. 
27, 2017) (saying “he plans to work three days a week at the agency and three days 
at OMB”). By appointing the sitting OMB director as acting Bureau head, the 
White House effectively took over the CFPB. Indeed, on November 27, 2017, 
                                                
5  Appellee Mulvaney’s appointment is also invalid because his existing duties 
at OMB, which involve budgetary and management issues within the Executive 
Branch, are not germane to the CFPB Director’s duty, which is to “enforce Federal 
consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers 
have access to markets for consumer financial products and services and that 
markets for consumer financial products are fair, transparent, and competitive.”  12 
U.S.C. § 5511(a).  See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 164 (1994); 
Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300-01 (1893). 
USCA Case #18-5007      Document #1716740            Filed: 02/06/2018      Page 32 of 46
24 
Appellee Mulvaney confirmed this was the case, telling the press: “The Trump 
Administration is now in charge” of the CFPB. See, e.g., Mick Mulvaney, News 
Conference, C-SPAN, http://cs.pn/2AxVT65.  
This appointment of the OMB Director as Acting CFPB Director is a blatant 
violation of Congress’s multiple directives against OMB intrusion into CFPB 
affairs. Congress decreed in Dodd-Frank that the CFPB will be “an independent 
bureau,” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a), yet a top White House official is now in charge, 
without opportunity for Senate confirmation, in direct contravention of Dodd-
Frank’s prohibition against OMB “jurisdiction or oversight over the affairs or 
operations of the Bureau,” id. § 5497(a)(4)(E).  
Appellee Mulvaney’s actions to date violate other key statutory provisions 
that wall off the CFPB from OMB. The sitting OMB Director now reviews and 
approves any proposed “legislative recommendations, or testimony or comments 
on legislation” by the CFPB to Congress, in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(4). 
Similarly, Appellee Mulvaney, despite sitting as OMB Director, now signs off on 
the CFPB’s financial operating plans, forecasts, and quarterly reports, contrary to 
12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(4)(E). While in his CFPB capacity, Appellee Mulvaney 
revealed his OMB hat in his recent letter to the Federal Reserve requesting $0 in 
funding for the Bureau for second quarter 2018, on grounds that this would 
“reduce the federal deficit….” Letter to Janet L. Yellen from Mick Mulvaney (Jan. 
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17, 2018), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fy2018_q2_funding-
request-letter-to-frb.pdf. 
Appellee Mulvaney is also reviewing and acting on CFPB rules and 
rulemakings while serving as OMB Director. His involvement in CFPB 
rulemaking is especially problematic in light of E.O. 12866, which expressly 
exempts the CFPB from OIRA review.  
OIRA, as an office of OMB, 31 U.S.C. § 505, is an arm of the White House. 
See The White House, OMB Offices, http://bit.ly/2B14gdL. Because OIRA reports 
to Appellee Mulvaney, CFPB rulemaking is effectively under OIRA scrutiny so 
long as Appellee Mulvaney holds both his current posts. In fact, American Banker 
quoted Appellee Mulvaney on December 4, 2017—after he claimed to be serving 
as Acting CFPB Director—as saying: “You could imagine that the Office of 
Management and Budget under the Trump administration might look very 
cautiously, even cynically, against rules that were produced by” the previous CFPB 
Director, Richard Cordray. Ian McKendry, Mulvaney’s first days at CFPB: 
payday, personnel and a prank, AM. BANKER, Dec. 4, 2017. Later, in an email to 
CFPB staff, Appellee Mulvaney demanded even more quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis of proposed Bureau actions than already provided. Memorandum from 
Mick Mulvaney (Jan. 23, 2018), http://bit.ly/2DZELLC. As these pronouncements 
show, Appellee Mulvaney cannot review CFPB rulemakings impartially; instead, 
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he views them through the lens of the White House and OMB.  
Early on, Appellee Mulvaney announced one of his first decisions was to 
freeze all new rules, regulations, and guidance by the CFPB for 30 days. See, e.g., 
Mick Mulvaney, News Conference, C-SPAN, http://cs.pn/2AxVT65. He also 
stopped implementation of new CFPB final rules on payday loans, prepaid cards, 
and expanded data collection on mortgages. See Yuka Hayashi, New CFPB Chief 
Curbs Data Collection, Citing Cybersecurity Worries, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2017; 
Renae Merle, Consumer protection bureau changes direction, will reconsider rule 
that sets stricter limits on payday lending, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2018; Evan 
Weinberger, CFPB Gives Cos. More Time To Comply With Prepaid Rule, LAW360 
(Jan. 25, 2018). As this shows, Appellee Mulvaney, while OMB head, has moved 
aggressively to place CFPB rulemaking under White House control. 
Appellee Trump’s tweet on December 8, 2017 shows the degree to which 
the White House is exerting policy control over the CFPB through Appellee 
Mulvaney:  
Fines and penalties against Wells Fargo Bank for their bad acts 
against their customers and others will not be dropped, as has 
incorrectly been reported, but will be pursued and, if anything, 
substantially increased. I will cut Regs but make penalties severe 
when caught cheating! 
 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:18 AM), 
http://bit.ly/2jv1m6u. Of course, the President lacks statutory authority to 
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dictate whether the CFPB, as an independent agency, takes enforcement 
actions, imposes fines, or adopts or rescinds rules. Nevertheless, the 
President boasted about his ability to do exactly that.   
Meanwhile, the CFPB has halted enforcement proceedings on 
Appellee Mulvaney’s watch. The agency halted an investigation into an 
installment lender that had contributed to Appellee Mulvaney when he was a 
congressman. Renae Merle, ‘The fish rots from the head down’; Former 
consumer protection bureau chief fires back at Trump successor, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 24, 2018. CFPB attorneys also withdrew a pending enforcement 
action against payday lenders under his aegis without giving a reason.  
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Golden Valley Lending, Inc., et 
al., Civil Case No. 2:17-cv-02521-JAR-JPO (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2018).  
The District Court ignored both Dodd-Frank’s strictures again OMB 
interference and the numerous ways Appellee Mulvaney’s appointment 
abridges CFPB independence. JA 282-85. Indeed, the Court went so far as to 
suggest that any abridgement was immaterial because his appointment was 
“time-limited.” JA 279. But OMB can only act through live individuals, and 
Appellee Mulvaney, as OMB’s Director, is OMB’s most powerful 
instrument of control. Furthermore, the temporary nature of his appointment 
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is irrelevant, because his decisions as Acting CFPB Director to rescind 
enforcement actions or rules will allow new consumer abuses to flourish. If 
Dodd-Frank’s multiple provisions cordoning off the CFPB from OMB mean 
anything, they mean that no OMB Director or employee may serve as Acting 
Director of the CFPB. 
In short, Appellee Mulvaney’s appointment as Acting CFPB Director while 
continuing to serve at OMB puts the CFPB under the day-to-day thumb of the 
White House. This sort of White House control, unmediated by Senate 
confirmation, undermines the CFPB’s statutory independence and Congress’s 
express decision to reject the FVRA mechanism and have the Dodd-Frank Act 
control the CFPB’s Directorship succession.  
* * * 
For the reasons explained above, only the Dodd-Frank Act applies to 
determine the succession of the Acting CFPB Directorship in the event of a 
vacancy, which means that until and unless the Senate confirms a Presidential 
nominee (or one is installed through a recess appointment), the Deputy Director of 
the CFPB, Leandra English, is the only lawful Acting Director.  
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III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court should grant Appellant’s appeal.
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Courtney Weiner 
Courtney Weiner 
Courtney Weiner  
LAW OFFICE OF COURTNEY WEINER, 
PLLC 
1629 K Street, Northwest, Suite 300  
Washington, DC 20006  
(202) 827-9980 
cw@courtneyweinerlaw.com 
Dated: February 6, 2018 Counsel for Amici 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Kathleen C. Engel is a Research Professor of Law at Suffolk University. 
She serves on the CFPB’s Consumer Advisory Board (CAB); however, the views 
she expresses here are her own, not those of the CAB, the CFPB, or the United 
States.  
Dalié Jiménez is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law. From 2011-12, she served in the Research, Markets & 
Regulation division at the CFPB. 
Adam J. Levitin is the Agnes N. Williams Research Professor of Law at the 
Georgetown University Law Center. He previously served on the CFPB’s CAB 
and as counsel to the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program. He is currently engaged as an expert witness by the CFPB, but is not 
representing the Bureau in serving as amicus curiae.  
Patricia A. McCoy is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. In 
2011, she founded the Mortgage Markets unit at the CFPB and oversaw the 
Bureau’s mortgage initiatives.  
Richard Alderman is a Professor Emeritus of Law and Director of the 
Consumer Law Center at the University of Houston Law Center. 
Ethan S. Bernstein is an Assistant Professor in the Organizational Behavior 
unit and the Berol Corporation Fellow at the Harvard Business School. He 
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previously served as the CFPB’s Chief Strategy Officer and Deputy Assistant 
Director of Mortgage Markets. 
Mark E. Budnitz is a Professor of Law, Emeritus, at Georgia State 
University College of Law and the former Executive Director of the National 
Consumer Law Center. He has written extensively about consumer financial 
services.  
Prentiss Cox is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of 
Minnesota Law School. He was a member of the inaugural CFPB’s CAB and 
previously was Manager of Consumer Enforcement at the Minnesota Attorney 
General's Office. 
Benjamin P. Edwards is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law. He writes about financial 
regulation and consumer protection. 
Judith Fox is a Clinical Professor of Law and the Director of the Economic 
Justice Project at Notre Dame Law School. She is a member of the CFPB’s CAB; 
however, the views she expresses here are her own, not those of the CAB, the 
CFPB, or the United States.  
Robert C. Hockett is the Edward Cornell Professor of Law at Cornell Law 
School, specializing in finance and financial regulation. He has previously worked 
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at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the International Monetary Fund 
and is a Fellow of The Century Foundation.  
Edward Janger is the David M. Barse Professor at Brooklyn Law School. 
He writes about bankruptcy, commercial law and consumer credit.   
Cathy Lesser Mansfield is a Professor of Law at Drake University, where 
she teaches and conducts research in the field of consumer law. 
Nathalie Martin is the Frederick M. Hart Chair in Consumer and Clinical 
Law at the University of New Mexico School of Law.             
Christopher L. Peterson is the John J. Flynn Endowed Professor of Law at 
the University of Utah’s S.J. Quinney College of Law. From 2012-2016, he was 
Special Advisor to the Director and Senior Counsel for Enforcement Policy & 
Strategy at the CFPB.  
Heidi Mandanis Schooner is Professor of Law at the Columbus School of 
Law at The Catholic University of America.  Her research focuses on the 
regulation of financial institutions and consumer financial services. 
Norman I. Silber is Professor of Law at the Maurice A. Deane School of 
Law at Hofstra University and Senior Research Scholar at Yale Law School. He 
has taught consumer law at both institutions, participated in law reform activities, 
advised committees of the New York State Legislature, and written about 
consumer financial regulation.
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Jeff Sovern is a Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law, 
where he has taught and written about consumer law for more than thirty years. 
Jennifer Taub is a Professor at Vermont Law School and author of the 
financial crisis book Other People’s Houses (Yale Press, 2014).
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., is Professor of Law at George Washington 
University Law School.  He has published many articles dealing with financial 
regulation, and he served as a consultant to the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission in 2010. 
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supporting Appellant who represent potential litigants, Amici here bring a scholarly 
perspective arising from their extensive study of the statutes underpinning this area 
of law. 
/s/ Courtney Weiner 
Courtney Weiner 
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LAW OFFICE OF COURTNEY WEINER, 
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